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ABSTRACT
User tracking on the Internet can come in various forms, e.g., via
cookies or by fingerprinting web browsers. A technique that got
less attention so far is user tracking based on TLS and specifically
based on the TLS session resumption mechanism. To the best of
our knowledge, we are the first that investigate the applicability of
TLS session resumption for user tracking. For that, we evaluated
the configuration of 48 popular browsers and one million of the
most popular websites. Moreover, we present a so-called prolon-
gation attack, which allows extending the tracking period beyond
the lifetime of the session resumption mechanism. To show that
under the observed browser configurations tracking via TLS session
resumptions is feasible, we also looked into DNS data to understand
the longest consecutive tracking period for a user by a particular
website. Our results indicate that with the standard setting of the
session resumption lifetime in many current browsers, the average
user can be tracked for up to eight days. With a session resumption
lifetime of seven days, as recommended upper limit in the draft
for TLS version 1.3, 65% of all users in our dataset can be tracked
permanently.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Browser security; Privacy protec-
tions;
KEYWORDS
Session IDs, Session Tickets, PSK Identity, Tracking Period, Browser
Measurement
1 INTRODUCTION
User tracking via HTTP cookies and browser fingerprinting is a re-
ality [2, 4, 15]. Tracking mechanisms are commonly used to observe
conversions, namely whether an advertisement on website A leads
to a desired user activity on website B. Herrmann et al. [5] revealed
that temporary tracking mechanisms can be used to identify users
based on their characteristic browsing patterns over longer time
periods. They found that 85, 4% of users can be identified based
on their browsing behaviour if the temporary tracking mechanism
lasts up to 24 hours. Also, the creation of long-term browsing pro-
files is possible, if a tracker can observe a large share of a user’s
browsing activity. Big players like Google and Facebook leverage
the wide-spread use of their advertising networks and social plugins
to track users across websites and gain detailed user profiles.
However, as users are increasingly aware of the privacy threat
from tracking, they use privacy-friendly browsers, private browsing
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modes, and browser extensions to restrict tracking practices such as
HTTP cookies. Browser fingerprinting gotmore difficult, as trackers
can hardly distinguish the fingerprints of mobile browsers. They are
often not as unique as their counterparts on desktop systems [4, 12].
Tracking based on IP addresses is restricted because of NAT that
causes users to share public IP addresses and it cannot track devices
across different networks. As a result, trackers have an increased
interest in additional methods for regaining the visibility on the
browsing habits of users. The result is a race of arms between
trackers as well as privacy-aware users and browser vendors.
One novel tracking technique could be based on TLS session re-
sumption, which allows abbreviating TLS handshakes by leveraging
key material exchanged in an earlier TLS session. Thus, it intro-
duces a possibility to link two TLS sessions. However, continuous
user tracking via TLS session resumption is only possible as long as
the browser is not restarted, because this clears the TLS cache. Espe-
cially mobile devices are always on and seldomly restarted. Finally,
the feasibility of user tracking via TLS session resumption depends
on the TLS configuration of both server and browser, as well as on
the user’s browsing behaviour. It is unknown so far whether this
approach is feasible for user tracking in real-world scenarios.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to report on the
applicability of TLS session resumption for user tracking. The main
contributions of our paper are:
• We measure session resumption lifetimes of all Alexa Top
Million websites and the same for 48 browsers. We assess the
real-world configuration of these mechanisms and derive
the possible duration of user tracking, respectively.
• We introduce the prolongation attack that allows to extend
the tracking period beyond the session resumption lifetime.
• We analyse the impact of the prolongation attack on the
resulting tracking periods and on the ratio of permanently
trackable users, based on an additional DNS dataset to de-
rive the users’ browsing behaviour. Our results indicate that
based on a session resumption lifetime of one day, as stan-
dard setting in many popular browsers, the average user can
be tracked for up to 8 days. With a session resumption life-
time of seven days, which reflects the recommended upper
limit by the draft on TLS version 1.3, even 65% of all users
in our dataset could be tracked permanently by at least one
website in the Alexa dataset.
• We propose countermeasures that require modifying the
TLS standard and the configuration of popular browsers to
impede tracking based on TLS session resumption. Most
effective is to disable TLS session resumption completely.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2
describes the background on TLS session resumption. Section 3
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Client Server
[Application Data]
…,               
ClientKeyExchange, …, Finished
ServerHello, Certificate, …
ClientHello
Finished
a) Full Handshake
Client Server
[Application Data]
…, Finished
ServerHello, SessionID, …, Finished
ClientHello, SessionID
b) Session Resumption with
Session ID
Client Server
[Application Data]
…, Finished
ServerHello, SessionTicket (empty),
…, Finished
ClientHello, SessionTicket
c) Session Resumption with
Session Ticket
Figure 1: Handshakes in TLS 1.2 with and without session resumption, highlighting encrypted data.
reviews the privacy problems arising from the usage of TLS and
Section 4 explains the collection of data we used in this paper.
Section 5 summarizes our major results on tracking via TLS session
resumption. Countermeasures are summarized in Section 6 and
related work is reviewed in Section 7. Section 8 concludes the paper.
2 BACKGROUND
In this section, we describe session identifiers (IDs) and session
tickets as methods to resume a previous TLS connection for TLS
up to version 1.2 [20]. Then, we regard session resumption via pre-
shared keys (PSK), which is proposed in the draft of TLS 1.3 [19]
and not compatible with previous resumption methods. Finally, we
compare the presented mechanisms to each other.
2.1 Session ID Resumption
In this mechanism, the server assigns a random session ID during
the initial handshake with the browser (client). Client and server
store this session ID along with the session keys and connection
states. To resume a session, the client sends the stored session
ID with the first protocol message (ClientHello) to the server, as
shown in Figure 1 b). If the server recognises the connection and is
willing to resume the session, it replies with the same session ID to
re-establish the respective session.
2.2 Session Ticket Resumption
This approach is defined in RFC 5077 [3] as an extension of the TLS
protocol. In its initial ClientHello message, the client is required
to express support for session ticket resumption, which will be
acknowledged with an appropriate ServerHello response. After the
key exchange between server and client, the server provides the
client with an encrypted session ticket, which is transmitted outside
of the TLS encrypted channel. This ticket contains the session keys
and connection states, which are encrypted with the private session
ticket encryption key (STEK) of the server. The client stores this
session ticket along with the used session key and connection states.
Upon reconnection, the client includes the session ticket within
the ClientHello message as shown in Figure 1 c). The server then
decrypts the session ticket with the STEK and retrieves session
key and connection state. If the server accepts the ticket, then the
session can be resumed with an abbreviated handshake.
2.3 Session Resumption via Pre-Shared Keys
The draft of TLS 1.3 [19] replaces session IDs and session tickets
with the concept of session resumption via pre-shared keys (PSK),
which works as shown in Figure 2. After the initial handshake, the
server sends a PSK identity to the client. The content of the PSK
identity depends on the server and may contain a database lookup
key or a self-encrypted and self-authenticated ticket. The client
stores this PSK identity along with its own session keys.
In a subsequent handshake, the client provides this PSK identity
within the ClientHello message to the server as seen in Figure 2 b)
and 2 c). Depending on the content of the PSK identity, the server
decrypts the ticket and uses the contained session keys and connec-
tion states to resume the session, or the server uses the contained
lookup key to find the session keys and connection states in its
own database.
2.4 Comparison of Session Resumption
Mechanisms
Session resumption via PSK introduces several improvements re-
garding tracking. In contrast to session tickets and session IDs, the
server sends the PSK identity after an initial handshake through
the encrypted TLS channel. Furthermore, the server can issue mul-
tiple PSK identities at once, thus each resumption attempt uses a
different PSK identity. These improvements by session resumption
via PSK, protect against a correlation of single user sessions by a
passive network-based observer.
RFC 5246 [20] recommends a lifetime of session IDs of less than
24 hours, the draft of TLS 1.3 [19] extends this duration to seven
days. No maximum lifetime is specified for session tickets in the
RFC 5077 [3]. However, servers may provide a hint to the client
about their individually supported maximum lifetime. Thus, for
session tickets the lifetime may exceed 24 hours.
The full handshake of TLS 1.3 (see Figure 2 a) requires one round
trip less to complete in comparison to TLS 1.2 (see Figure 1 a). Thus,
regarding performance, the methods of session IDs, session tickets,
and 1-round-trip time (RTT) session resumption via PSK require
the same number of round trips as the full handshake of TLS 1.3,
while 0-RTT session resumption via PSK can save one additional
round trip.
Another distinction of the discussed resumption mechanisms is
their ability to provide forward secrecy. Forward secrecy describes
the property of secure communication protocols, that a compro-
mised long-term cryptographic key does not lead to a compromise
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Certificate
Client Server
[Application Data]
…,               
ClientHello, KeyShare
Finished
Finished, [Application Data]
ServerHello, KeyShare,
, …,                                              
a) Full Handshake
Finished, [Application Data]
Client Server
[Application Data]
ServerHello, PSK, EarlyData,
…,                                              
EndOfEarlyData, …, Finished
[Application Data]
ClientHello, KeyShare, PSK,
EarlyData, …,                               
b) 0-RTT Session Resumption
Client Server
[Application Data]
…,               
ClientHello, KeyShare, PSK
Finished
Finished, [Application Data]
ServerHello, PSK,
…,                                              
c) 1-RTT Session Resumption
Figure 2: Handshakes in TLS 1.3 with and without session resumption, highlighting encrypted data.
of the confidentiality of past sessions. TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 generally
support forward secrecy by using Diffie-Hellman key establishment
to negotiate a temporary, symmetric session key.
From a security perspective, TLS 1.3 improves previous TLS pro-
tocol versions by supporting forward secrecy for 1-RTT session re-
sumption (see Figure 2 c) through Diffie-Hellman key establishment,
however it is not mandatory [19]. In the case of 0-RTT resumptions,
forward secrecy cannot be realised for the first application data
transmitted by the client. Thus, session resumption in TLS 1.2 and
partially in TLS 1.3 reduces the communication security compared
to a fresh TLS session.
Another drawback of 0-RTT resumption is that servers need
to implement countermeasures against replay attacks, which TLS
itself guards against for other resumption mechanisms. Thus, in
TLS 1.3, session resumptions with a reduced number of round trips
can only be realised at the cost of reduced security guarantees.
Table 1 provides a brief overview of the differences between the
TLS session resumption mechanisms.
3 PRIVACY PROBLEMS WITH TLS SESSION
RESUMPTION
In this section, we describe the impact of session resumption life-
times on users’ privacy. Subsequently, we review the consequences
of an unrestricted use of session resumption mechanisms with
third-party online trackers.
3.1 Lifetime of Session Resumption
Mechanisms
Always on and always with are characteristics of mobile devices
such as smartphones and tablets that provide a ubiquitous access
to the Internet and account for about half of all web browsing
activities [23]. A web browser along with its TLS cache can remain
active for multiple days in the background of mobile operating
systems. Thus, very long session resumption lifetimes of several
days or weeks are technically feasible.
Furthermore, the attempt of a client to resume a session by
transmitting an identifier to the server leaks the identifier to the
server regardless of whether the session is resumed or rejected (see
Figure 3). Thus, the identifier leakage is sufficient to correlate the
initial and the newly established session to the same entity.
To further extend the capability of online tracking, a website
might issue a new identifier (session ID, session ticket or PSK iden-
tity) on each revisit, and thus track a user indefinitely as long as the
time between two visits does not exceed the session resumption
Certificate
Client Server
[Application Data]
…,               
ServerHello, KeyShare,
, …,                                               
ClientHello, KeyShare, PSK
[NewPSK]
Links both 
PSKs to client
Resets
lifetime
Finished
Finished, [Application Data]
Figure 3: Prolongation attack, where the client attempts a
TLS 1.3 1-RTT resumption and the server falls back to a full
handshake. The server can link both PSKs to the same user,
while the user’s resumption lifetime is prolonged with the
new PSK.
lifetime of the user’s browser. We refer to this server behaviour
as prolongation attack. The TLS standard does not define client
behaviour in a way to prevent this attack. While Figure 3 refers to
TLS 1.3 1-RTT, similar attacks apply to 0-RTT and previous TLS
versions.
3.2 Third-Party Tracking via Session
Resumption
Third-party tracking refers to a practice, where a party, other than
the targeted website, can track a user’s visit. It is a widespread
phenomenon on the Internet with an average of 17.7 third-party
trackers per website across the Alexa Top 500 categories [2]. Google
with its various hostnames is present on nearly 80% of the Alexa
Top Million Sites [2, 9] and thus can gain deep insights on users’
browsing behaviour.
As for tracking via session resumption, third-party trackers can
recognise users based on the identifier, which they present to re-
sume a previous TLS session. Thus, the tracker can link multiple
observed visits of the user across sites, where the tracker is included
as a third-party. However, to distinguish the various first-party sites
a user visited, the tracker requires an identifier such as a HTTP
referrer or a custom URL per first-party.
4 DATA COLLECTION
In this section, we describe our various data sources which we
use to determine the feasibility of online tracking based on TLS
session resumption. For our empirical analysis, we accumulated
the TLS configuration of popular online services and browsers.
Furthermore, we investigate web browsing patterns of users based
on a DNS traffic data set.
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Table 1: Comparison of TLS session resumption mechanisms
Session ID Session Tickets 0-RTT via PSK 1-RTT via PSK
Server stores its own secret TLS state yes no optional optional
Number of RTT compared to full handshake -1 RTT -1 RTT -1 RTT identical
Initial handshake contains unencrypted identifier yes yes no no
Identifier reuse for multiple connections yes yes should not should not
Forward secrecy no no no optional
Uses one key for sessions of multiple users no yes optional optional
Recommended limit of the resumption lifetime 24h [20] >24h [3] 7 days [19] 7 days [19]
4.1 Alexa Top Million Data Set
To get an estimate on the usage of TLS session resumption in
the web and to conduct a qualitative analysis of the used session
resumption mechanisms we measured the HTTPS behaviour of
the Alexa Top Million Sites [9]. Over a period of 31-days in March
and April of 2018, we connected daily to each and every site in the
Alexa Top Million on TCP port 443 using the OpenSSL Toolkit [18]
and recorded the handshake behaviour.
To probe the configured session resumption lifetime for session
IDs and session tickets used by the Alexa Top Hundred Thousand,
we revisited each website periodically in intervals of five minutes
or less, each time presenting the identical session ID or session
ticket, respectively.
Tomeasure which sites share their session ID cache or STEKwith
other online services, we saved the TLS connection state of a session
with one site and tried to pairwise reconnect this state to the other
websites in the sample. Subsequently, we created groups of sites
that allow mutual session resumption. This pairwise evaluation
causes quadratic cost, therefore we reduced our sample to the Alexa
Top Thousand Sites.
We conducted all scans from our university campus and followed
best practices of active scanning [1].
4.2 Browser Measurements
To assess the browser behaviour in regard to session resumption we
used a sample of 48 browsers for mobile and desktop platforms as
shown in Table 2. This sample includes the most popular browsers
with respect to their global market share [14, 16, 22], which were
publicly accessible for either iOS, Android, and/or desktop operat-
ing systems. Besides the most popular browsers, we included Tor
Browser, Orbot, Brave, Cliqz, JonDoBrowser, and Ghostery Privacy
Browser as explicitly privacy-friendly browsers to our sample.
To gather the configured maximum resumption lifetimes of each
browser and for each different resumption mechanisms, we used
a test website with a custom JavaScript probe. We attempted to
resume a session after varying intervals of up to 24 hours since the
initial handshake. On each connection attempt, the server checks
and records if the initially established session resumption identifier
is transmitted. We tried only one session resumption per initial
handshake to avoid potential side effects like a prolongation of the
browser’s resumption lifetime.
To test if browsers enable third-parties to link user activities on
different websites as described in Section 3.2, we used a testbed
as illustrated in Figure 4. The browser consecutively retrieves the
websites A and B, which include the same third-party T.We observe,
whether a session resumption with T is possible from the context
of different first parties A and B.
User
Website A
(incl. T)
Website B
(incl. T)
Third-party T
Loading Website A
Loading Website B
Figure 4: Testbed to measure browser behaviour in regard of
third-party tracking.
4.3 DNS Data Set
To estimate the impact of the presented prolongation attack (see
Section 3.1) on the tracking period of a user, we evaluate real-world
browsing patterns. Furthermore, these browsing patterns allow us
to approximate the ratio of resumed revisits for a given session
resumption lifetime.
We obtained the data set used in [5, 6, 11], which contains the
pseudonymized DNS traffic logs of 3862 students over a period of
two months between April 30, 2010 and June 29, 2010. The data set
originates from the student housing network at the University of
Regensburg.
Our sample of DNS logs contains only the fraction of Internet
traffic that originates from the students’ unique and static IP address
accessible within their room. Note that this sample might not cover
the whole traffic of all users and thus our conclusions might only
describe a lower boundary in regard to user tracking via TLS session
resumption. A descriptive statistic of the used DNS data set can be
found in [5].
We restricted our evaluations to a pseudonymized DNS data set
to address ethical concerns. Besides a pseudonym for the source IP
address, we also pseudonymized target hostnames on a per user
basis. This approach prevents background knowledge attacks that
use knowledge about the browsing history of another user within
this data set.
Consequently, each record in our data set consists of a pseudo-
nym for the source IP address, the query time, a pseudonym for the
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78%
18%
4%
Sess. Tickets
& Sess. IDs
Only Sess. IDs
No Sess.
Resumption
Figure 5: Supported session resumption mechanisms for
TLS-enabled sites in Alexa Top Million on 15th April 2018.
target hostname, and query type. For our analysis we considered
only DNS queries of regular name resolution for IPv4 addresses as
well as IPv6 addresses.
5 EVALUATION
To evaluate the feasibility of tracking based on TLS session resump-
tion, we analyse in this section the configuration of servers and
browsers and to which extent they restrict the session resumption
mechanisms. Afterwards, we investigate real-world browsing pat-
terns and check whether the technical restrictions of browsers are
suitable to protect users’ privacy against online tracking services.
5.1 Evaluation of Server Configurations
The feasibility of TLS session resumption as a tracking mechanism
depends considerably on the configuration of the server. In this
section, we investigate the adaptation of TLS session resumption
mechanisms, real-world configurations for the session resumption
lifetime and security-related configuration issues.
5.1.1 Adoption of TLS Session Resumption Mechanisms. Figure 5
shows the support of TLS-enabled Alexa Top Million Sites for ses-
sion resumption based on IDs or tickets. This measurement from
the 15th April 2018 does not include session resumption via PSK be-
cause TLS 1.3 was still a draft at that point. In total, we found 691 280
sites among the Alexa Top Million that supported TLS. 95.9% of
these sites do either support session IDs or both IDs and tickets.
The remaining 28 236 sites do not support TLS session resumption
by, for example, providing an empty string as an ID which does not
allow to resume a session.
With 536 088 websites, 77.6% of all TLS-enabled Alexa Top Mil-
lion Sites do also support session tickets. Note that, if a client-server
pair supports both session resumption mechanisms, then TLS ses-
sion tickets will be the preferred resumption mechanism [3].
5.1.2 Lifetime of Session Resumption Mechanisms. The server
can include a lifetime hint along with the session ticket or PSK
identity. If the browser respects lifetime hints, it will only try to
resume previous sessions within this hinted lifetime.
The lifetime hints of TLS session tickets for the Alexa TopMillion
set (solid, red line) and Alexa Top Hundred Thousand set (dotted,
blue line) are shown as cumulative distribution in Figure 6. This
plot is normalised to the total number of obtained tickets, which
were 535 306 and 56 407 for the respective sets on the 24th March
2018. With 46% and 71%, a lifetime hint of five minutes is the most
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Figure 6: Cumulative distribution of Alexa Top Sites over
short hinted and measured lifetimes of session tickets.
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Figure 7: Cumulative distribution of Alexa Top Sites over
long hinted lifetimes of session resumption tickets.
popular configuration within the Alexa Top Hundred Thousand
and Alexa Top Million respectively.
In both sets, around 2% of all sites use a lifetime hint of zero
seconds. We interpret this configuration as erroneous because this
effectively prevents session resumption. Instead, server operators
should deactivate the session ticket extension to save resources for
both server and client if they choose not to support session tickets.
We observe, that more than 80% of TLS session ticket enabled
sites within the Alexa Top Million chose lifetime hints of less than
or equal to ten minutes. However, around 10% of the remaining sites
use lifetime hints larger than 24 hours. Google and Facebook as
market leaders in behavioural advertising show particularly large
hinted session resumption lifetimes. Facebook’s lifetime hint of
48 hours is above the 99.99% percentile of all session ticket hints
that we collected in our scans. Google and various of its domains
are configured to a ticket lifetime of 28 hours, which is above the
97, 13% percentile in the Alexa Top Million Sites (see Figure 7).
To validate these results about lifetime hints, we measured the
maximum session resumption lifetimes for session IDs and session
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Figure 8: Cumulative distribution over themeasured session
resumption lifetime with session IDs.
tickets. We limited our sample size to the Alexa Top Hundred Thou-
sand Sites for practicality reasons. Figure 6 and 8 show these results
as green, dashed line for tickets and IDs, respectively. We find, that
around 10% of the sites do not allow a resumption with session tick-
ets immediately after the initial visit, while, for session IDs these are
23% of the websites. We observe in both figures, that approximately
40% of the sites support maximum resumption lifetimes above five
minutes. More than 20% of websites within the Alexa Top Hundred
Thousand that support session IDs allow resumptions after more
than two hours.
As can be seen in Figure 6, our measurement of the maximum
resumption lifetime deviates within a range of 10 to 55 minutes
from the blue, dotted plot of the corresponding lifetime hints. So
far, we are not able to explain this zig-zag shape of the green plot.
5.1.3 Security Issues of TLS Server Configurations. In this sec-
tion, we empirically measure TLS state sharing, where multiple sites
share their cryptographic secrets for user sessions. Furthermore,
we evaluate the lifetime of Session Ticket Encryption Keys (STEK).
These two measurements allow us to assess the vulnerable period
and the number of vulnerable websites in case of a compromise of
a site’s STEK.
A passive, network-based observer in possession of a compro-
mised STEK can decrypt the initial and the resumed sessions in
TLS 1.2 due to the missing forward secrecy for session resump-
tion (see Section 2.4). This issue becomes more severe as STEKs are
shared across multiple hostnames, which increases the number of
potentially affected sessions as well as the attack surface.
We measured the shared TLS state by attempting to resume
sessions of website A, where A is within Alexa Top Thousand, on
every other site of the Alexa Top Thousand.
Figure 9 shows that 72% of the Alexa Top Thousand do either
not support session resumption or do not share their TLS state with
any other site of the Alexa Top Thousand. However, around 16%
of websites share their TLS state with at least 25 other sites of the
Alexa Top Thousand. The largest shared TLS state within the Alexa
Top Thousand counts 84 sites and belongs to Google.
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Figure 9: Cumulative distribution over the size of sharedTLS
states among sites within the Alexa Top Thousand.
49%
24%
17%
10%
Days  1
1 < Days  3
3 < Days  14
Days > 14
Figure 10: Distribution of Alexa Top Million Sites over the
period for which they encrypt session tickets with the iden-
tical cryptographic key.
RFC 5077 [3] recommends a scheme for the construction of
TLS session tickets, which includes an identifier for the respective
STEK.With daily scans of the Alex TopMillion Sites for 31-days, we
obtained a sample of over 16 million session tickets. In the next step,
we assigned each site their corresponding set of STEK identifiers.
Figure 10 shows, that 73% of the TLS session ticket enabled Alexa
Top Million Sites to change their STEK within three days. However,
10% of the websites with support for session tickets did not change
their STEK within two weeks. Consequently, a compromised STEK
from such a website allows a network-based observer to decrypt
all sessions that use session tickets with this site for at least two
weeks.
Note that TLS implementations might deviate from the recom-
mended construction scheme for session tickets [3]. Our setup
expects session tickets to follow the recommended structure, devi-
ating websites are therefore falsely classified as exchanging STEKs
with every new ticket. Thus, Figure 10 shows only a lower bound-
ary of websites that change their STEK less frequently than every
24 hours.
5.2 Evaluation of Browser Configurations
In this section, we investigate the default configuration of popular
web browsers to determine the feasibility of user tracking via TLS
session resumption. First, we report on the session resumption
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lifetime of browsers for session IDs and tickets. Then, we evaluate
the capability of third-parties to track users across different first-
party websites.
Table 2: TLS session resumption configuration of browsers
Pl
t. Browser Lifetime forSess. ID
Lifetime for
Sess. Ticket
Third-party
tracking
360 Sec. Bro. v9.1 600 min 540 min blocked
Amigo v61.0 30 min 30 min viable
Brave 30 min 30 min viable
Chrome v66.0 60 min 30 min viable
Cliqz 1 day 10 min viable
Coc Coc v68.4 30 min 30 min viable
Comodo Dra. v63 30 min 30 min viable
Firefox v59.0 1 day 1 day viable
Internet Expl. v11 600 min 600 min viable
JonDoBrowser - - blocked
Konqueror v5.0 30 min 30 min blocked
K-Meleon v75.1 1 day 1 day viable
Lunascape v6.15 600 min 540 min viable
Maxthon v5.2 30 min 30 min viable
Microsoft Edge v41 600 min 600 min blocked
Opera v52 30 min 30 min viable
Pale Moon v27 1 day 10 min viable
QQ Browser v10 30 min 30 min viable
QupZilla v2.2.6 30 min 30 min viable
Safari v11.1 1 day 1 day viable
SeaMonkey v2.49 1 day 1 day viable
Sleipnir v6.2 30 min 30 min blocked
Sogou Expl. v8 30 min 30 min viable
SRWare Iron v65 30 min 30 min viable
Tor Browser - - blocked
UC Browser v7.0 30 min 30 min viable
D
es
kt
op
Vivaldi v1.14 30 min 30 min viable
Amigo v1.10.187 60 min 30 min viable
Android Bro. v7.1.2 30 min 30 min viable
Brave v1.0.42 60 min 30 min viable
Cheetah Bro. v5.22 60 min 30 min viable
Chrome v61.0 30 min 60 min viable
Cliqz v1.6.2 60 min 30 min viable
Firefox v56.0 1 day 20 min viable
Ghostery Priv. v1.3 30 min 30 min viable
Maxthon v4.5.10 30 min 30 min viable
Opera Mini v30.0 15 sec 15 sec viable
Orbot v16.0.0 - - blocked
QQ Bro. v1.2.0 1 day 1 day viable
Samsung Intern. v6 50 min 50 min viable
Sleipnir v 3.5.7 60 min 30 min viable
SRWare Iron v61.0 60 min 30 min viable
UC Browser v12.0 1 day 30 min viable
A
nd
ro
id
Yandex Bro. v18.1 50 min 30 min viable
Chrome v62.0 120 min - viable
Firefox v9.2 120 min - viable
Opera v16.0 120 min - viableiO
S
11
Safari v11.0 120 min - viable
5.2.1 Lifetime of Session Resumptions Mechanisms. The results
of measuring the session resumption lifetime are displayed in Ta-
ble 2. We note that only three browsers from the privacy-friendly
group do not support TLS session resumption, the remaining 45
browsers all support at least one resumption mechanisms.
We observe, that two-thirds of all tested browsers allow only
for a session resumption lifetime of up to 60 minutes for both
resumption mechanisms. Our measurement period is limited to
24 hours, therefore a stated one-day period might, in fact, be longer.
Some browsers such as Chrome, Opera, Firefox, and Safari were
tested on multiple platforms. For these browsers, we find that the
configuration of the session resumption lifetime is not consistent
across the investigated platforms. For example, the desktop version
of Safari is configured to a session resumption lifetime of 24 hours,
while the iOS version only supports resumptions for session IDs of
up to 120 minutes.
Furthermore, Table 2 shows that the lifetime for both investi-
gated resumption mechanisms differ for Cliqz (desktop), Pale Moon
(desktop), Firefox (Android), and UC Browser (Android) by more
than 23 hours. For browsers on iOS, we observe a homogeneous
behaviour in our measurements, which can be explained by Apple’s
requirement that all browser apps in the App Store use Apple’s
WebKit framework as rendering engine [8].
5.2.2 Third-party Tracking. We analysed whether the default
configuration of browsers allows resuming TLS sessions in the
context of different first-party websites. Table 2 shows, that only
the desktop browsers 360 Secure Browser, Konqueror, Microsoft
Edge, and Sleipnir restrict the session resumption support for third-
parties. Note, that the privacy-friendly browsers JonDoBrowser,
Tor Browser, and Orbot do not support TLS session resumption
mechanisms and thus also prevent third-party tracking in this re-
gard.
Our results show, that third-party tracking via TLS session re-
sumption is feasible for the large majority of investigated popular
browsers. However, our results about the session resumption life-
time (see Section 5.2.1) indicate the session resumption lifetime
is limited within the majority of investigated browsers. An expla-
nation of our results regarding third-party tracking could be that
browser vendors are mostly unaware of third-party tracking via
TLS session resumption.
5.3 Evaluation of Real-World User Traffic
In this section, we use real-world data from a DNS traffic data set to
assess the impact of different session resumption lifetimes on the
achievable length of tracking periods as well as the share of perma-
nently trackable users, respectively using the prolongation attack.
Subsequently, we analyse the impact of a chosen session resump-
tion lifetime on the expectable frequency of session resumptions
for revisits.
5.3.1 Assumptions and Limitations. Lacking access to a compre-
hensive data set of actual web browsing activity, we resort to a DNS
traffic data set as described in Section 4.3. For our evaluation, we
assume that all DNS name resolution queries in the data set led to
a TLS session. As discussed in Section 3, we reason that always on
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devices such as smartphones or tablets can achieve runtime dura-
tions for browsers and their TLS cache of several days for average
users. Therefore, we assume that users would not have cleared the
TLS cache of their browser within the tracking period. Note, that
the following evaluations only approximate actual website visits
since we cannot account for DNS caching effects.
5.3.2 Longest Consecutive Tracking Period. Tracking mecha-
nisms become more capable the longer it is possible to link user
behaviour to a known entity. Recall that by using the prolonga-
tion attack as described in Section 3.1, the period in which user
activities can be linked via session resumption identifiers can be
extended beyond a single session resumption lifetime. The extent
to which this prolongation is possible depends on the time between
consecutive visits of a website.
Definition 5.1. In the context of session resumption we use the
term consecutive tracking period to refer to a sequence of visits
v1, . . . ,vn to an online service where no interval between two visits
exceeds the given session resumption lifetime l . More formally, we
define the predicate P as
P(v1, . . . ,vn , l) ⇔ |ti − ti+1 | ≤ l ,∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,n − 1},
where ti denotes the time of visit vi .
Definition 5.2. We further define the longest consecutive track-
ing period lctp of a sequence of visits v1, . . . ,vn given a session
resumption lifetime l as the length of the longest subsequence of
visits that still fulfils the consecutive tracking period property, or
more formally as
lctp(v, l) 7→ max
i, j ∈{1, ...,n },i<j
|ti − tj |[P(vi , . . . ,vj , l)],
where ti again denotes the time of visit vi .
Figure 11 shows the longest consecutive tracking period as a
function of the session resumption lifetime determined from said
DNS data set with the same assumption as stated above. Each data
point depicts the maximum tracking period overall websites of the
respective user, or, more formally,
lctpmax(u, l) 7→ max
s ∈S lctp(vu,s , l),
where S denotes the set of all visited sites and vu,s the sequence
of visits by user u to site s . We plotted lctpmax for the median user
(blue, dotted line) and the average user (green, dashed line) of our
data set within total 3862 users.
We observe, that the length of the longest consecutive tracking
period differs widely among users. While some can be tracked with
a session resumption lifetime of 12 hours throughout the whole 61-
day period of data collection, the median user can only be tracked
for a period of about three days.
We also note that the gradient of these plots exhibits stronger
increments for session resumption lifetimes shorter than 20 min-
utes or longer than seven hours. It seems as if these seven hours
were chosen to overcome a user’s sleeping phase with reduced on-
line activity because for such longer lifetimes, the tracking period
becomes longer than one day.
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Figure 11: The longest consecutive tracking period per user
plotted as a function of the session resumption lifetime for
the prolongation attack scenario.
5.3.3 Share of Permanently Trackable User. Next, we evaluate
the share of those users in our DNS data set that can be monitored
throughout the 61-days sample period. We uphold the assumptions
as stated above.
Definition 5.3. We define a user as permanently trackable by a
given site, if the visits to this site fulfil the consecutive tracking
period property and the time between the first (resp. last) visit and
the start (resp. end) of the sample is less than or equal to the given
session resumption lifetime. With the last restriction we ensure,
that the user tracking can possibly continue beyond the boundaries
of our sample period.
As can be seen in Figure 12, with a session resumption lifetime of
seven days, 65% of all users within our data set can be permanently
tracked by at least one website. By limiting the session resump-
tion lifetime to 24 hours, the share of permanently trackable user
declines to only 1.3%.
5.3.4 Ratio of Resumed Revisits. In the interest of providing em-
pirical data to quantify performance gains from resumed session,
we investigate the impact of different session resumption lifetimes
on the ratio of resumed revisits. We denote revisits which hap-
pen within the session resumption lifetime of the previous visit as
resumed revisit.
Definition 5.4. We define as resumption ratio of a sequence of
visits v1, . . . ,vn by the same user to an online service given a
session resumption lifetime l as
rr (v, l) 7→ |{i ∈ {1, . . . ,n − 1} ∧ |ti − ti+1 | ≤ l}|
n − 1 ,
where ti denotes the time of visit vi .
Figure 13 shows the cumulative distribution of website revisits
as a function of the interval between two visits by the same user.
We observe a large share of 17.7% of all revisits can be resumed
with a session resumption lifetime of five minutes. It can be further
observed, that the probability of a revisit decreases continuously
with the time since the last visit. Moreover, we find that about half
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Figure 12: Cumulative distribution of permanently track-
able user over session resumption lifetime for the prolon-
gation attack scenario.
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Figure 13: Cumulative distribution of revisits of websites
plotted over the time between two visits by the same user.
of all revisits occur during the first hour and 95.2% within the first
week.
6 COUNTERMEASURES
Ultimately, this leads us to a discussion of potential countermea-
sures.A complete protection against tracking via TLS session
resumption is achieved by deactivating this feature as it is
practised by the privacy-friendly JonDoBrowser and Tor Browser.
A strict deactivation consequently excludes a browser from perfor-
mance gains, such as the reduced number of round trips of TLS 1.3
0-RTT session resumption.
RFCs on session resumption mechanisms such as TLS 1.3 [19]
should be extended in a way, that they exclude a possible pro-
longation of the lifetime of session resumption mechanisms (see
Section 3.1). We recommend that a server-initiated renewal of a
session identifier must not lead to a prolongation of client-side ex-
piry dates. Instead, a client must stick to the expiry date of the
initial session identifier. This protects against the prolongation
attack (see Section 3.1).
The recommended upper limit of the session resumption
lifetime in TLS 1.3 [19] of seven days should be reduced to
hinder tracking based on this mechanism. We propose an upper
lifetime limit of ten minutes based on our empirical observations.
We note, that more than 80% of the Alexa Top Million Sites restrict
the session resumption lifetime to less or equal to ten minutes by
their own choice and 27, 7% of all revisits of a site occur during this
period. Furthermore, the average visit duration of popular websites
is of the order of ten minutes [13], thus this lifetime limit hinders
the correlation of multiple page visits by the same user.
Browser vendors should address the issue of third-party
tracking via TLS session resumption, either by deactivating
session resumption for third-parties or by allowing only session
resumptions to third-parties if the first party site is identical.
Furthermore, considering that TLS 1.3 1-RTT session resumption
does not lead to a reduced number of round trips compared to the
full handshake, the temporal gains of this mechanism have its origin
in the reduced computational complexity of the abbreviated hand-
shake and are rather small. For a latency of 133 ms, which is in the
range of 3G mobile network connections, we approximate the tem-
poral gain of TLS 1.3 1-RTT to be in an order of 1% compared to the
full handshake. Thus, due to the low temporal gains, it seems
acceptable to deactivate TLS 1.3 1-RTT session resumption
for privacy reasons.
TLS 1.3 0-RTT provides higher temporal gains by reducing the
number of required round trips. However, it is not a replacement
of TLS 1.3 1-RTT due to its reduced security guarantees (see Sec-
tion 2.4). Thus, by limiting the support for session resumption
to TLS 1.3 0-RTT the number of resumed sessions should decrease,
while the temporal gains are rather high.
Finally, we reported in Section 5.1.3 that at least 10% of the Alexa
Top Million Sites use their STEK for a period of at least two weeks.
Since the STEK makes it possible to decrypt all sessions that use
session tickets from such a site, we suggest that aminimum STEK
change rate should be standardised to reduce this vulnerable
period.
7 RELATEDWORK
The impact of TLS on the privacy of its users has already been a
focus of previous research. Wachs et al. [24] show in their work,
that the TLS client certificate authentication transmits unique client
certificates in plaintext and thus allows a passive eavesdropper
to re-identify and track users. However, websites do not widely
use TLS client certificate authentication due to its complexity [24].
Thus, it is less feasible to be employed by online tracking service
to observe users’ browsing behaviour.
Empirical research by Husák et al. [7] investigated the feasibility
of monitoring TLS handshakes to fingerprint and identify clients.
They found, that especially the supported cipher suite lists vary
among various client applications and their versions. This allows
them, to infer the client application with a certain precision based
on the observed cipher suit list. While this result may be beneficial
to network securitymonitoring to detect anomalies, it is not suitable
for commercial user tracking because of the few observed TLS client
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configurations during the handshake, do not allow to uniquely
distinguish users.
Springall et al. [21] investigated security problems of TLS session
resumption such as STEK lifetime, forward secrecy and TLS state
sharing based on measurements of the Alexa Top Million Sites.
However, to the best of our knowledge, the feasibility of user
tracking based on TLS session resumption has not been investigated
so far. The privacy implications of session resumption have only
been of concern to software projects. The Tor Browser disabled ses-
sion resumption due to privacy considerations [17]. Moreover, the
chromium project lists session resumption mechanisms as capable
to allow client identification [10].
8 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied the feasibility of user tracking via TLS
session resumption. For that, we evaluated the configuration of
popular browsers and online services as well as behavioural user
patterns.
Our results indicate, that most major browsers support TLS ses-
sion resumption. Only three privacy-friendly browsers deactivated
this feature. Almost all investigated browsers support tracking
periods of at least 30 minutes based on TLS session resumption.
We even observed several browsers with session resumption life-
times of at least 24 hours, e.g., Firefox or Safari. Additionally, we
investigated whether browsers protect against third-party tracking
based on TLS session resumption, which allows to re-identify users
across different websites in which the third-parties are embedded
as well. Our results indicate that the majority of tested browsers
in their standard configuration does not protect users against such
third-party tracking.
In addition to the browsers, we also checked the TLS configu-
rations of web servers delivering the Alexa Top Million Sites. We
found that the majority of these websites use resumption lifetimes
of up to ten minutes, which might be an indication that tracking
based on TLS session resumption is not widely applied yet. How-
ever, we also observe that especially big players like Google and
Facebook use exceptionally long session resumption lifetimes of 28
and 48 hours, respectively. Nevertheless, as longer session resump-
tion lifetimes decrease the load on web servers significantly, this is
not a clear indication that the tracking technique is used by them.
As the main contribution of this paper, we present a prolongation
attack against the TLS standard, which allows to extend the tracking
period beyond the session resumption lifetime. Based on a real-
world data set on DNS traffic from 2010 with 3862 users we found
that with a session resumption lifetime of 24 hours there is one
website in the dataset that would be able to track the average user
over a period of eight days. The draft of TLS 1.3 [19] proposes
an upper session resumption lifetime of seven days. We analysed
that such a configuration of session resumption mechanisms would
make 65% of all users permanently trackable by at least one single
website from our data set. However, compared to today the data
set contains fewer web requests coming from mobile devices. They
render tracking based on TLS session resumption easier, because
of their always on-property and as they amplified the frequency
users access certain (major) websites.
To mitigate the presented privacy problems, we propose coun-
termeasures to the TLS standard and to browser vendors. The most
effective technique is to disable TLS session resumption in browsers
completely.
In summary, we hope that our work leads to greater awareness of
the privacy risks coming from TLS session resumption and fosters
further research on this topic.
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